




DANIEL R. ORTIZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the forty years since the Supreme Court entered the “political 
thicket”1 it has done much work.  To mention just a few of its efforts, 
in enforcing the Constitution the Court has required decennial redis-
tricting of all state legislatures and multimember congressional dele-
gations under the rule of one person, one vote;2 it has laid down many 
rules for how Congress and state legislatures can regulate campaign 
spending;3 it has defined how politics has to take account—and can-
not take account—of race;4 and it has determined what kinds of elec-
 
 † John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  I wish to 
thank Andrew Boldt and Jesse Green for aid in research and the members of the class 
of 1957 of the University of Virginia School of Law whose Class of 1957 Summer Re-
search Grant helped support this project.  The discussion of the issues surrounding 
partisan gerrymandering relies in part on an amicus brief I wrote for The Reform Insti-
tute in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the partisan gerrymandering case from Pennsylvania decided by 
the Supreme Court at 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).  Tom Mann, Norm Ornstein, and Trevor 
Potter helped me develop much of this particular discussion.    
 1  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
2 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-68 (1964) (state legislative districts); Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (congressional districts). 
3 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 643-719 (2003) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of most portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002); 
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161-63 (2003) (finding provisions and regulations of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 barring direct corporate campaign contri-
butions to nonprofit advocacy corporation to be consistent with First Amendment); 
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990) (upholding 
a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for 
independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates in elections for 
state office); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding in 
part, and finding unconstitutional in part, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971). 
4 See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (holding that district 
court’s finding that race, rather than politics, was the predominant factor in North 
Carolina legislature’s congressional redistricting plan was clearly erroneous); Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-52 (1993) (finding that an allegation that North Carolina’s 
redistricting legislation was designed to segregate races for voting purposes was suffi-
cient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 
613, 627-28 (1982) (holding a Georgia county’s system of at-large elections unconstitu-
tional); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-70 (1973) (finding that a Texas House of 
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toral structures are and are not permissible.5  In interpreting several 
statutes, particularly the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it has also unset-
tled many traditional electoral arrangements.6  Nearly all of this work 
has been difficult and contentious.  In few other areas have the 
Court’s decisions so directly and personally interested members of the 
political branches of government while resting so weakly on the widely 
recognized and traditionally authoritative guides to constitutional 
construction (e.g., constitutional text and intent). 
Beginning explicitly with Baker v. Carr, one argument, the “got 
theory” argument, has had great play in these cases7.  The “got theory” 
argument maintains that the Court must defer to the political 
branches in these political cases to avoid freezing one particular the-
ory of politics into the structure of governance.8  No matter how cer-
tain the Court is that a particular theory of equality, representation, or 
political behavior is right, the argument goes, it should nonetheless 
refrain from striking down conflicting arrangements, because doing 
so would displace the state’s own choice among competing and ac-
ceptable political theories.  So stated, the “got theory” argument has 
much to recommend it.  It cautions judicial humility, recognizes di-
versity of judgment on matters concerning local conditions and tradi-
tions, and allows for experimentation by different parts of govern-
ment.  In short, the argument goes, often one size does not fit all. 
The “got theory” argument made its greatest play in the reappor-
tionment cases.9  I discuss in Part I how the argument framed the is-
sues in those cases.  In general, how well did it work?  Did it empha-
size certain values and concerns and ignore others?  Did it have an 
 
Representatives reapportionment plan was not invidiously discriminatory, but that the 
disestablishment of two multimember districts in the plan was justified because of the 
history of discrimination against minorities in those districts.). 
5 See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (holding un-
constitutional the imposition of blanket primary against political party’s wishes); 
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding poll tax uncon-
stitutional). 
6 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (construing Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 with respect to use of multimember districts in North Carolina legislative ap-
portionment); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (applying Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 to state election laws and regulations). 
7 369 U.S. 186, 224-29 (1962). 
8 See, e.g., infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Frank-
furter’s application of a “got theory” argument in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion)). 
9 See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). 
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identifiable substantive agenda?  And, in the end, did it fulfill or be-
tray its rhetorical appeal?  In Part II, I look at this argument in a more 
contemporary setting:  the partisan gerrymandering cases.  After lay-
ing out the surprisingly complex issues these cases pose, I explore how 
the “got theory” argument addresses and spins them.  I conclude by 
reflecting that, although the “got theory” argument could play a help-
ful role in deciding these and perhaps other cases, in practice it has 
not.  Instead of deepening consideration of the political concerns un-
derlying the cases, the argument has been used to foreclose such con-
sideration.  It has operated more as a conversation stopper than as the 
conversation starter its rhetoric suggests. 
I.  ENTERING THE “POLITICAL THICKET” 
A.  Initial Hesitation:  Colegrove v. Green 
Colegrove v. Green10 foreshadowed the deepest arguments in the re-
apportionment cases.  Three voters sued to have declared unconstitu-
tional an Illinois congressional districting scheme in which some dis-
tricts contained many more people than others.  The largest district, 
in fact, contained 914,000 people—over eight times the 112,116 in the 
smallest district.11  These three voters from larger districts claimed that 
the scheme violated equal protection because they had proportion-
ately less representation in the House of Representatives.  The Su-
preme Court did not even consider the claim.  Both Justice Frank-
furter, writing for a plurality of three Justices, and Justice Rutledge, 
writing for himself, voted to dismiss the case for want of equity.12  The 
voters’ first recourse, Justice Frankfurter thought, should be to the Il-
linois state legislature.  If people were unhappy, they should simply 
vote in a state legislature that would give them relief:  “The remedy for 
unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will appor-
tion properly . . . .”13  And, if that should fail, those from larger dis-
tricts should “invoke the ample powers of Congress”14 to fix things.  
Because Justice Frankfurter believed that the Constitution “conferred 
upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the 
 
10 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
11 Id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion); id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concur-
ring). 
13 Id. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). 
14 Id. 
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States in the popular House and left to that House determination 
whether States have fulfilled their responsibility,”15 he thought it de-
prived the courts of all power to act.  The Constitution, by vesting 
Congress with such authority, thus simply foreclosed the possibility of 
judicial remedy. 
More fundamentally, Justice Frankfurter believed that the case in-
volved a choice among theories of representation that state legisla-
tures should be able to make.  As he put it: 
The basis for the suit is . . . a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity.  In ef-
fect this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral 
process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the 
councils of the Nation.  Because the Illinois legislature has failed to re-
vise its Congressional Representative districts in order to reflect great 
changes, during more than a generation, in the distribution of its popu-
lation, we are asked to do this, as it were, for Illinois.
16
 
In his view, the case concerned no injury to individuals,17 but a 
claim that the state’s political leaders were wasting Illinois’ representa-
tional capital in national politics.18  It asserted, in other words, an in-
jury that ran to the state, not one that ran directly to some citizens 
while favoring others.  The case thus represented a kind of political 
“derivative action” where the principals (voters) were suing the man-
aging agents (state politicians) for malfeasance to the polity as a 
whole.  Any individual injury came only through a citizen’s stake in 
the impaired polity. 
Framed in this way, the case posed no question about how indi-
viduals should be represented in the House, but at most asked 
whether the state’s choice of representational policy, which created 
some districts with many more people than others, wasted the state’s 
national influence.  And as to that question, Justice Frankfurter 
thought, the state’s political leaders were likely in a better position 
than the federal courts to make a decision.19  To carry the “derivative 
action” analogy one step further, the courts were as ill-suited to review 
these kinds of political decisions as they are to review ordinary busi-
 
15 Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 
16 Id. at 552 (citations omitted). 
17 See id. (“The basis for the suit is not a private wrong . . . .”). 
18 See id. (“In effect, this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the elec-
toral process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils 
of the Nation.”). 
19 Cf. id. at 553 (“Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters 
that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests.  From the 
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.”). 
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ness decisions.  Consequently, courts should follow a type of “political 
judgment” rule, which just like its counterpart, the business judgment 
rule, would insulate first-order decision makers from judicial second-
guessing.20 
Judicial deference, moreover, was particularly appropriate when 
the courts, as Justice Frankfurter assumed, had no power to draw sin-
gle-member districts.21  At most, he thought, a court could declare an 
existing single-member districting scheme unconstitutional, which 
would mean that all of Illinois’ congressional candidates would have 
to run in one statewide at-large district.22  It is at this point that Justice 
Frankfurter grapples directly with the value of different theories of 
representation.  Even if the courts were to intervene and declare that 
the state could not follow a particular view of what theory of represen-
tation best suited Illinois, the courts’ only remedy would be to impose 
at-large House elections on the state—a practice that, he noted, itself 
rested on a largely discredited theory of representation.23  Because of 
his view of the courts’ limited remedial powers, then, Justice Frank-
furter believed that striking a plan resting on a bad theory of repre-
sentation might result in a plan resting on an even worse one. 
Questions, of course, dog every step of Justice Frankfurter’s rea-
soning.  Just to start, exactly where does the Constitution say Congress 
 
20 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (defining the business 
judgment rule as the “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company”), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see generally Douglas M. Branson, The Rule 
that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 (2002) (discussing 
and criticizing the business judgment rule); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573 (analyzing justifications for the business 
judgment rule). 
21 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553 (“Of course no court can affirmatively remap the 
Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of fairness 
for a representative system.”). 
22 Id. 
23 See id. (“The upshot of judicial action may defeat the vital political principle 
which led Congress, more than a hundred years ago, to require districting.”).  As 
Chancellor James Kent wrote: 
[E]lection of members of Congress by districts . . . [is] recommended by the 
wisdom and justice of giving, as far as possible, to the local subdivisions of the 
people of each state, a due influence in the choice of representatives, so as 
not to leave the aggregate minority of the people in a state, though approach-
ing perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpowered by the combined action 
of the numerical majority, without any voice whatever in the national councils. 
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *230-31 (1873), quoted in Colegrove, 
328 U.S. at 553. 
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shall have exclusive remedial authority?24  If the text and original intent 
of the Constitution do not make Congress’s remedial power exclusive, 
should the Court do so, especially when Congress has long failed in 
this area and individual congressmen’s incumbency interests weigh 
against congressional action?  As Justice Frankfurter himself methodi-
cally documented,25 so many states were severely malapportioned that 
the principle of unseating a state’s congressional delegation on this 
ground would have led to the unseating of many representatives, 
which would have made it hard for many in Congress to vote for it.  
And relying on state legislatures for a remedy was similarly unpromis-
ing.  As Justice Black noted in dissent, the case rested in part on the 
allegation that corresponding malapportionment of the Illinois state 
legislature foreclosed any relief from that source.26  Furthermore, was 
equity really insufficiently flexible at the time to permit courts to draw 
single-member districts?  And even if it was, was there any real risk that 
a state legislature faced with at-large congressional districts would not 
back down and draw equipopulous single-member districts? 
Beyond remedy, the questions remain just as pressing.  Why, for 
example, was the voters’ injury derivative, not personal?  The plaintiffs 
were complaining, after all, that the scheme violated a personal right 
to equal representation.27  Did they not have such a right?  Or was it 
one that the state could subordinate in the interest of best represent-
ing the state qua state?  Should the Constitution, which originally in-
tended the House of Representatives to represent the people rather 
than the states as polities,28 allow the state to make such a choice?  Jus-
 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 & § 5, cl. 1 (establishing, in part, that “[t]he 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations,” and that “[e]ach House shall be the 
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members”). 
25 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 557-59 app. I (charting the disparities in apportion-
ment between the largest and smallest district in each state). 
26 See id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he issues of state and congressional ap-
portionment are thus so interdependent that it is to the interest of state legislators to 
perpetuate the inequitable apportionment of both state and congressional election 
districts.”). 
27 See id. at 567 (“Appellants claim that since they live in the heavily populated dis-
tricts their vote is much less effective than the vote of the those living in [the smallest 
districts] . . . .”). 
28 Indeed, the Framers intended that the House of Representatives be fixed in 
such a way as to preclude state government control over the House: 
[B]eing fixed by the State constitutions, [the House of Representatives] is not 
alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of 
the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to 
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tice Frankfurter is simply silent on all of these questions.  Still, if one 
grants his initial assumptions (1) that the injury is derivative, not per-
sonal, and (2) that drawing a single statewide at-large district was the 
only available judicial remedy, his approach has something to recom-
mend it.  The legislature is probably in a better position than a court 
to decide what is best for the state as a polity and, if the at-large dis-
trict stuck, the court would be imposing a poor theory of representa-
tion on the state.29  Furthermore, the individual voters’ claims would 
not bear on any injury to the state itself.  From this perspective their 
claim to equal proportional representation in Congress would repre-
sent a claim for special, not equal, treatment relative to other citizens 
because it would partially appropriate to some citizens an opportunity 
that properly belongs to the polity as a whole.  It would be as if a 
shareholder demanded private use of a corporate asset. 
Justice Frankfurter implicitly adopts here an early form of the “got 
theory” argument, recognizing that a malapportionment claim would 
impose a particular theory of representation on the state—the theory 
that representation is a right that runs to individuals rather than to 
the polity as a whole.  His use of the argument, of course, is disap-
pointing:  he nowhere defends his major, controversial assumptions.  
But in other ways his use of it makes good sense.  He identifies a par-
ticular competing theory of representation that recognizing malap-
portionment claims would displace, finds value in that theory, and 
thus rejects the invitation to displace it.  In fact, he does this twice—
once in refusing to conceptualize malapportionment as involving an 
individual right and once in rejecting what he sees as the only avail-
able judicial remedy as being worse than the harm itself.  The “got 
theory” argument allows him to identify and weigh the theories on 
both sides and so serves to deepen and broaden the analysis.  It does 
not simply defer to state autonomy. 
B.  Jumping into the Thicket:  Baker v. Carr 
In Baker v. Carr,30 the Supreme Court opened the courthouse door 
to exactly those claims that Colegrove foreclosed.  The Tennessee Con-
 
abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) (Robert 
Scigliano ed., 2000). 
29 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress and courts 
agree that at-large districts are a poor alternative for representation). 
30 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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stitution required that state representatives “be apportioned among 
the several counties or districts, according to the number of qualified 
voters in each,”31 and that state senators be apportioned  “according to 
the number of qualified electors.”32  Despite this express constitutional 
command, the Tennessee General Assembly had not passed a reap-
portionment bill since 1901.33  Since then, the population of Tennes-
see had grown substantially and shifted across the state.  In 1901, the 
state’s population was 2,020,616 of whom 487,380 were eligible to 
vote; in 1960, its population was 3,567,089 of whom 2,092,891 were 
eligible to vote—an increase of more than 325% in the number of eli-
gible voters and more than 75% in the state’s total population.34  And, 
as the Court noted, “[t]he relative standings of the counties in terms 
of qualified voters ha[d] changed significantly.”35  By 1961, Tennes-
see’s most populous state senate district contained 5.2 times as many 
people as the least populous district.36  The disparity in Tennessee’s 
House of Representatives was even greater.  There the largest district 
was roughly eighteen times the size of the smallest.37 
Voters from the state’s larger districts sued to have the scheme de-
clared unconstitutional, and a majority of the Court, although it did 
not reach the merits, found the case justiciable.38  In heated dissents, 
however, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued strongly that the 
Court should not have heard the case.39  At bottom, they believed, the 
case concerned a conflict between two competing theories of political 
 
31 TENN. CONST. art. II, § 5 (prior to 1966 amendment). 
 32  Id. § 6. 
33 Tennessee’s current apportionment scheme is set forth in TENN. CODE ANN. § 
3-1-102 to -103 (Michie 1994 & 2001 Supp.).  Except for a few minor revisions, see, e.g., 
1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 220 (increasing Shelby County’s number of representatives 
from seven and one-half to eight), Tennessee had not significantly modified the 1901 
reapportionment, 1901 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch.122, at the time of Baker v. Carr.  See Baker, 
369 U.S. at 187 & n.1, app. at 237-41 (discussing the history of reapportionment bills in 
Tennessee and reprinting several of the most significant historical changes in Tennes-
see’s apportionment statute). 
34 Baker, 369 U.S. at 192. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 274-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter points out that 
this statistic is based on the number of voting-age persons in the districts.  Conse-
quently, Justice Frankfurter points out, the statistic may be inaccurate because it does 
not account for other (i.e., non-age) voting eligibility restrictions, such as citizenship 
and residency requirements.  See id. at 274 n.7. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 237 (majority opinion). 
39 Id. at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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representation, both of which were permissible.40  As Justice Frank-
furter put it: 
What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among com-
peting bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing 
theories of political philosophy—in order to establish an appropriate 
frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all the 
States of the Union. 
 . . . What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread method 
of representation—-representation by local geographical division, only 
in part respective of population—-in preference to others, others, for-
sooth, more appealing.  Appellants contest this choice and seek to make 
this Court the arbiter of the disagreement.  They would make the Equal 
Protection Clause the charter of adjudication, asserting that the equality 
which it guarantees comports, if not the assurance of equal weight to 
every voter’s vote, at least the basic conception that representation ought 
to be proportionate to population, a standard by reference to which the 
reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged.
41
 
He then noted that in deciding such an apportionment claim, the 
Court would have to inquire “into the theoretic base of representation 
in an acceptably republican state”:42 
For a court could not determine the equal-protection issue without in 
fact first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is 
reasonable for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame 
of government, basically, is allowed.  To divorce “equal protection” from 
“Republican Form” is to talk about half a question. 
 The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic 
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary element of 
equality between man and man that it must be taken to be the standard 
of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment—-that it 
is, in appellants’ words “the basic principle of representative govern-
ment”—is, to put it bluntly, not true. . . . Unless judges, the judges of this 
 
40 Cf. id. at 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat lies at the core of this controversy 
is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative government.”).  Gener-
ally accepted bases of representation include representation proportioned by popula-
tion and fixed representation by geographical unit.  Yet there have been many varia-
tions on both of these basic theories, including provisions for minimum and maximum 
representations per district, and rules changing the aggregation of counties into dis-
tricts (regardless of population).  Variations may arise from the desire to support re-
gional politics, limit the influence of metropolitan areas, or other political concerns.  
See generally id. at 300-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (presenting various theories of 
representation and their histories). 
41 Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. at 301. 
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Court, are to make their private views of political wisdom the measure of 
the Constitution—-views which in all honesty cannot but give the ap-
pearance, if not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of 
partisan politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies—-
the Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, provides no 
guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem.43 
To Frankfurter, several different bases of representation were pos-
sible.  “Apportionment, by its character,” he wrote: 
[I]s a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving—-even after the 
fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a 
representative legislature have been fought out or compromised—-
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, eco-
nomic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local 
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like 
the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled us-
age, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status, 




Presumably, to his mind, any of these concerns could legitimately 
override equipopulousness. 
Justice Harlan extended this “got theory” argument in two ways.  
First, he defended against the obvious embarrassment that the Ten-
nessee legislature had failed to redistrict in over sixty years.45  In other 
words, even if Justice Frankfurter’s alternative theories of representa-
tion were permissible in the abstract, one might well question whether 
the Tennessee plan actually embodied any of them.  Was it not simply 
a product of inertia or perhaps of no public policy at all?  Justice 
Harlan argued, however, that the legislature’s long failure to redistrict 
might itself reflect a deep judgment about the proper nature of repre-
sentation.  Assuming that the 1901 apportionment was originally valid, 
which was actually contested in the case,46 Justice Harlan thought ei-
ther that the plan might by accident have come to reflect some desir-
able theory of representation, which the legislature’s inaction en-
dorsed, or that, even if the plan did not reflect a theory, the 
 
43 Id. at 301-02 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
44 Id. at 323. 
45 See id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is within legislative dis-
cretion to defer reapportionment). 
46 See id. at 192 (majority opinion) (“[T]he complaint alleges that the 1901 statute, 
even as of the time of its passage, ‘made no apportionment of Representatives and 
Senators in accordance with the constitutional formula . . . , but instead arbitrarily and 
capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate and House without refer-
ence . . . to any logical or reasonable formula whatever.’” (omissions in original)). 
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legislature might legitimately have valued stability over whatever in-
terests the original 1901 plan served.  The courts, he wrote, are: 
[A]sked to say that the passage of time has rendered the 1901 appor-
tionment obsolete to the point where its continuance becomes vulner-
able under the Fourteenth Amendment.  But is not this matter one that 
involves a classic legislative judgment?  Surely it lies within the province 
of a state legislature to conclude that an existing allocation of senators 
and representatives constitutes a desirable balance of geographical and 
demographical representation, or that in the interest of stability of gov-
ernment it would be best to defer for some further time the redistribu-
tion of seats in the state legislature.
47
 
Justice Harlan argued, in other words, that a principled theory of 
representation could not only lead a legislature to draw districts of 
very different sizes, but could also lead it to refuse to redistrict at all 
for over 60 years—-even in the face of an express state constitutional 
command to the contrary.  His argument magically transformed seem-
ing inertia into a robust and sound exercise of judgment over repre-
sentational theories. 
Second, Justice Harlan defended against the argument that the 
legislature’s inaction had a simple and clear explanation:  Tennessee 
legislators’ interest in continued incumbency.  With no redistricting, 
those incumbents would retain the districts that had last elected them 
and likely maintain their existing support among known constituents.  
Interestingly, Justice Harlan did not argue that incumbent self-interest 
was not the actual reason why the legislature had failed to act.  He just 
declared that even if that were the reason, it would be irrelevant.  The 
conclusion that the Court should not intervene, he thought: 
[C]an hardly be escaped by suggesting that capricious state action might 
be found were it to appear that a majority of the Tennessee legislators, in 
refusing to consider reapportionment, had been actuated by self-interest 
in perpetuating their own political offices or by other unworthy or im-
proper motives.  Since Fletcher v. Peck was decided many years ago, it has 
repeatedly been pointed out that it is not the business of the federal 





47 Id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 337 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)).  He would have applied 
something like reduced scrutiny to the plan and declared that the federal courts sim-
ply had no role “once it appears . . . that the state action complained of could have 
rested on some rational basis.”  Baker, 369 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). 
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C.  The Problems with Early “Got Theory” Arguments  
and Justice Stewart’s “Third Way” 
On their surface, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s arguments 
have much appeal.  By refusing to impose one particular and contest-
able vision of representation on the structure of politics, they would 
allow states to experiment with different models and determine which 
models best fit local cultures, traditions, and conditions.  Stated this 
way, the argument appears dynamic and progressive.  Since the good-
ness of different theories of representation changes over time, leaving 
the choice between theories open avoids freezing-in a particular, and 
perhaps only temporary, consensus as to the proper structure of gov-
ernment.  In this view, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan are not des-
perately defending the status quo, but struggling to preserve the peo-
ple’s ability to debate one of the most fundamental issues of 
democratic governance and to refashion politics.  They, not the ma-
jority, are the champions of change and progress. 
There are, however, some obvious difficulties with their use of the 
“got theory” argument.  For one thing, they fail to analyze any of the 
competing theories they hold out as possibilities.49  Are all of them ac-
ceptable alternatives to equipopulousness?  How much constitutional 
weight, for example, should possibilities such as “the lobby and the 
city machine” and “respect for proven incumbents” be given?50  
Should somewhat weightier-sounding concerns like “electoral conven-
ience” and “considerations of geography”51 completely or only par-
tially trump equipopulousness?  Failing to consider the legitimacy of a 
competing theory can lead to much difficulty.  Under this approach, 
for example, many long-discredited political practices would be unob-
jectionable.  Many parts of the country, for example, long employed 
property qualifications52 and defended them as a way of ensuring that 
the electorate was informed, engaged, and independent.53  Only those 
who held property, the argument ran, had enough stake in the com-
munity to be trusted to do what was truly best for all and to be free 
from economic dependence on, and thus coercion from, others, 
 
49 See supra note 40 (identifying competing bases of representation). 
50 Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. 
52 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE app. tbls.A.1-A.3, A.9, A.11, & A.13 
(2000) (documenting property qualifications in state suffrage requirements over 
time). 
53 See id. at 5, 9 (describing the arguments for property qualifications in the colo-
nial era and after the American Revolution). 
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which would prevent the exercise of independent judgment.54  Nowa-
days, however, a court would view property qualifications with great 
suspicion.  The problem is not that no theory could support them, but 
rather that we now think it would be a bad theory.55  Contemporary 
conceptions of democracy wholly discredit property qualifications and 
the like. 
In addition to failing to evaluate alternatives, Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan’s “got theory” argument fails even to inquire whether an 
alternative actually supports the disputed plan.  If only because the 
legislature had not redistricted in over sixty years, one might suspect 
that Tennessee’s malapportionment reflected something other than 
merely a theory of representation different from the plaintiffs’ theory.  
Indeed, one might suspect any number of legislative motives that 
would reflect anything but laudable theories of representation.  For 
instance, one might suspect that the legislature’s failure to redistrict 
reflected a desire to disenfranchise voters, or perhaps that the failure 
was a result of gross self-interest on the part of incumbent legislators.  
And while Justice Harlan ingeniously portrays the Tennessee legisla-
ture’s inaction as a careful balancing aimed at political stability, he 
proves too much with this argument.  Without requiring any evidence 
that the legislature deliberately chose not to act, Justice Harlan’s ar-
gument would protect plans reflecting no legitimate reasons at all.  
The mere possibility that concern for stability could explain the dis-
tricting scheme would foreclose any claim of inertial malapportion-
ment. 
Consider how this type of “got theory” argument would have ad-
dressed two other now notorious electoral practices:  poll taxes and 
literacy tests.  For much of our history, many argued that both prac-
tices promoted republican aims.  Poll taxes, it was claimed, ensured 
that all who voted would care about public affairs.  If voting came at a 
 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 Cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating poll 
tax on similar grounds, and stating that “[v]oter qualifications have no relation to 
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax”); see generally KEYSSAR, supra 
note 52, at 269-73 (discussing the gradual elimination of economic voting qualifica-
tions through statute and constitutional decisions); J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in 
American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 512-16 (2004) (placing 
the invalidation of property qualifications and poll taxes in the context of “growing 
egalitarianism in American politics”); Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage:  
Female Voting Rights and the Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185, 235-37 (1998) (placing the poll tax debate in the 
context of the civil rights and gender equality movements, arguing that poll taxes were 
discriminatory). 
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cost, only those who cared would vote and electoral outcomes would 
reflect sound judgment.56  Literacy tests, it was argued, serve a similar 
civic function.  In theory, they ensured that all who voted could read 
and had enough basic understanding of American government to cast 
an informed and independent ballot.57  Despite these lofty purposes, 
however, there was much evidence that many jurisdictions adopted 
and continued to employ these devices for illegitimate reasons:  most 
notably, to frustrate voting by African Americans58 and, in some cases, 
poor whites.59  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach, however, 
would have ignored the actual discriminatory reasons for the devices’ 
continued use in favor of a hypothetical rationale that mattered not at 
all to those who used them.  In their view, the mere possibility of a 
civic rationale, no matter how tarnished by history, would overcome 
strong evidence of invidious motivation.60 
 
56 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting) (“State poll tax legislation can 
‘reasonably,’ ‘rationally’ and without an ‘invidious’ or evil purpose to injure anyone be 
found to rest on [the need for revenue collection and the] belief that voters who pay a 
poll tax will be interested in furthering the State’s welfare when they vote.”); id. at 677 
(noting “the long-standing beliefs that making the payment of a tax a prerequisite to 
voting is an effective way of collecting revenue and that people who pay their taxes are 
likely to have a far greater interest in their government”); id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (“[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax 
promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about public 
affairs to pay . . . for the exercise of the franchise.”); A.F. THOMAS, THE VIRGINIA CON-
STITUTION AND ITS POSSIBILITIES 12 (1901).   
57 As the Supreme Court noted in upholding literacy tests: 
[I]n our society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed mat-
ter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only 
those who are literate should exercise the franchise.  It was said last century in 
Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an independent and 
intelligent exercise of the right to suffrage. 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted); see also SAMUEL JONES, TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF SUF-
FRAGE 132-33 (Boston, Otis, Broaders & Co. 1842) (arguing that a basic education is 
necessary to enable people to exercise their right to vote in a manner that is  beneficial 
to the public). 
58 See J.N. BRENAMAN, A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA CONVENTIONS 89-90 (1902) (discuss-
ing Virginia’s use of literacy tests and poll taxes in its 1901-1902 constitutional conven-
tion to disenfranchise African American voters); KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 111-13 (de-
scribing efforts in the late nineteenth century to disenfranchise African American 
voters). 
59 FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 1-31 (1958) (arguing that 
the “disenfranchising movement” reflected a combination of factors, including the de-
sire to contain the populist movement by disenfranchising poor whites). 
60 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 335-36 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that the issue at stake in Baker is not racial or religious discrimination and there-
fore is not covered by the Equal Protection Clause). 
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To his credit, Justice Stewart, who was very sympathetic to Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan’s position, recognized its problems.  In Lucas 
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,61 the Court struck down a 
Colorado state reapportionment scheme favored by a majority of vot-
ers in every county over a competing plan that much more closely 
drew districts of equal population.62  Justice Stewart, in dissent, would 
have upheld the plan despite its population variance.  His test looked 
in Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s direction but sought to avoid 
their difficulties.  His test had two critical parts: 
First, [the Equal Protection Clause] demands that, in the light of the 
State’s own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a rational one.  
Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such as not to permit the sys-
tematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State.  
I think it is apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which 
could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systemati-
cally to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under 
accepted Equal Protection Clause standards.  But, beyond this, I think 
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a State from 
choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the in-
terests, temper, and customs of its people.
63
 
Unlike his two colleagues, Justice Stewart would have at least 
checked to ensure that some minimally rational theory actually sup-
ported the state’s plan and that the plan did not systematically frus-
trate majorities.  Each part of his test would have done some impor-
tant work.  The first would have looked through the hypothetical 
justifications Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have accepted, 
while the second would have ensured that the state paid some attention 
to equipopulousness.  A plan departing too sharply from this value 
would necessarily frustrate the will of some numerical majority.64 
Justice Stewart’s approach, of course, has its own problems.  Most 
notably, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to administer.65  By 
requiring courts to analyze whether districting plans are rational in 
 
61 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
62 Id. at 730-35. 
63 Id. at 753-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
64 Cf. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 754 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is apparent that any plan 
of legislative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply ar-
bitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown sys-
tematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under accepted 
Equal Protection Clause standards.” (footnote omitted)). 
65 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 56-59 (2003) 
(discussing Justice Stewart’s judicially unmanageable standard). 
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light of the state’s own characteristics and needs, the plan invites em-
barrassing and difficult judicial inquiry.  A court would have to sit in 
judgment of the merits of asserted state policies, make sure that the 
plan actually reflected them, and then weigh those policies against the 
competing demands of one person, one vote.  None of those tasks is 
well-suited to judicial inquiry.66  Whatever the faults of Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan’s approach—-giving the states a free pass—-it would 
have certainly avoided these difficulties and embarrassments.67 
The Court’s divisions in these early apportionment cases reveal 
three possible approaches.  First, the Court, as Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan’s “got theory” argument advocated, could simply assume 
that the state is acting—-or not acting—-for a valid reason no matter 
what evidence to the contrary there may be.  Such an approach is 
clearly administrable because it requires a court to do nothing.68  Even 
a redistricting plan reflecting only incumbent legislators’ desires to be 
reelected will satisfy it.  Second, the Court, as Justice Stewart’s version 
of the “got theory” argument recommended, could check to make 
sure that some valid theory supported the plan and require that some 
attention be paid to one particular theory—equipopulousness.  But 
while such an approach gives states and localities some choice among 
different theories of representation, judges are not well equipped or 
situated to apply it.  Third, as a majority of the Court eventually held 
in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court could impose some version of the one 
person, one vote standard.69  This standard is easily administered by 
courts, but vindicates one theory of representation—
equipopulousness—at the expense of all others.  Only individuals 
count in this theory of representation. 
The Court did not ultimately choose one person, one vote merely 
because it was the only administrable approach.  It was not.  Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach was even easier to apply.  Nor did 
 
66 See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:  Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 190 (1968) (noting the difficul-
ties inherent in courts making political decisions, in part because of “the practical im-
possibility of constructing a completely coherent system of constitutional law at any 
given time”). 
67 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter’s approach in Colegrove was attractive, in large part, 
because it allowed judicial humility and deference.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying 
notes 21-23. 
68 For instance, under Justice Frankfurter’s “got theory” approach, the Court sim-
ply refused to allow voters’ claims in Colegrove. 
69 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided 
equally by population). 
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the Court choose it because it represented the only legitimate theory 
of representation.  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were right about 
that.70  Rather, the Court chose it because it felt that some valid theory 
of representation should underlie apportionment, and one person, 
one vote was the only administrable approach that would ensure 
that.71  “Got theory” approaches, which would allow plans to embody 
other theories of representation, would either, like Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan’s approach, also allow plans to embody no legiti-
mate theory at all or, like Justice Stewart’s, be unadministrable in 
practice.  No approach other than imposing some particular theory 
could, practically speaking, ensure that a districting plan did indeed 
rest on some legitimate theory.  Despite its rhetorical progressiveness, 
the “got theory” argument, as invoked by Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan, amounts to a cry to protect the status quo.  It fails on its prom-
ise to encourage states to choose a political theory.  By simply hy-
pothesizing legitimate purposes that could underlie redistricting, it 
forecloses discussion about the very issues it claims are so important. 
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING:  THE NEXT GENERATION 
Partisan gerrymandering poses many of the same issues posed by 
redistricting plans.  And the central question remains the same:  
should the courts enter the “political thicket?”  Are judicially manage-
able standards available to discipline the practice?  To what extent 
does regulating partisan gerrymandering impose a particular and con-
testable theory of politics on the political process?  And are other 
permissible theories of politics compatible with this practice?  Unsur-
prisingly, the “got theory” argument has made several appearances in 
gerrymandering cases.  To understand its significance and how it op-
erates in this area, first we must understand what the partisan gerry-
mandering battle is all about.  Although it of course concerns one ma-
jor political party intentionally drawing districts to advantage itself at 
the expense of the other, the battle concerns much more than that.  
On the federal level, where I will exclusively discuss gerrymandering, 
it raises issues about the purpose and function of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the value of political competition, and how voters should 
 
70 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing competing theories of rep-
resentation and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s view that many different theories of 
representation are permissible). 
71 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-69 (dismissing the other proposed plans as “little more 
than crazy quilts, completely lacking in rationality” and deviating too egregiously from 
population based divisions). 
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be represented.  In this Part, I will lay out my own—perhaps tenden-
tious—views on these issues.  Whether one agrees with my particular 
positions on these issues, however, is unimportant to the overall ar-
gument.  Feel free to disagree and argue with them.  To understand 
how the “got theory” argument operates in this area it is important 
only to understand the issues themselves; it is not necessary to agree 
with my positions on them. 
A.  Gerrymandering the House of Representatives 
The Framers envisioned the House of Representatives as a unique 
structure of the national government.  Unlike the Senate, the Presi-
dent, or the courts, it was to have “an immediate dependence on, and 
an intimate sympathy with, the people.”72  As John Adams put it, the 
body of the people’s representatives should “be in miniature an exact 
portrait of the people at large.  It should think, feel, reason, and act 
like them.”73  With this in mind, the Framers carefully designed the 
House with an eye toward “binding the representatives to their con-
stituents” and to “extend[ing] the influence of the people over their 
representatives.”74  They insisted on direct election “by the People of 
the several States,”75 a broad franchise,76 regular reapportionment as 
among the states,77 and frequent elections.78  Of these, the last was the 
most important, for “without the restraint of frequent elections” in the 
House, the Framers thought, “[a]ll [other] securities [against oligar-
chy] would be found very insufficient.”79  By this device: 
 
 
72 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) 
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). 
73 John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 87 (Robert J. 
Taylor ed., 1979). 
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 339 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) 
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
76 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 366 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) 
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (discussing the composition of electorate). 
77 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 356-57 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamil-
ton)) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (noting the effect of the census on the composition 
of the House of Representatives). 
78 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) 
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (citing frequent elections as the only way to maintain 
common interests between the elected and the people). 
79 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 367 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) 
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). 
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[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the 
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.  
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their 
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled 
to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exer-
cise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from 
which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful dis-
charge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
80
 
Nearly every special feature of the House’s design was meant to ensure 
that it, unlike the other primary structures of the federal government, 
was highly responsive to public sentiment. 
To some people, congressional redistricting has defeated much of 
the Framers’ vision.  They believe that high rates of incumbent reelec-
tion, declining competitiveness of congressional districts, and long pe-
riods of one-party control of the House have eroded the accountabil-
ity and legitimacy of the people’s chamber.81  The 2002 congressional 
elections suggest this point strongly.  Only four challengers defeated 
House incumbents—the lowest number in modern American his-
tory.82  Only forty-three House incumbents, moreover, won reelection 
“narrowly”—defined generously as by less than sixty percent of the 
vote—while 338 House incumbents enjoyed very large victory mar-
gins—twenty percent or more, including seventy-eight incumbents 
who ran unopposed by a major party challenger.83  In the nation’s 
largest state, California, not a single challenger in the general election 
received as much as forty percent of the vote.84  And more than a third 
of all States sent exactly the same House delegation to Congress as was 





81 The best and most forceful advocate of this position is Sam Hirsch.  See Sam 
Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives:  What Went Wrong in the Latest Round 
of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 179 (2003) (discussing how “redis-
tricting has helped to transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a body that will 
no longer accurately reflect majority will”). 
82 Id. at 182; see also MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELEC-
TIONS, 1788-1997:  THE OFFICIAL RESULTS, at xx-xxi (1998) (showing percentage of in-
cumbents defeated in each election from the 2nd to the 105th Congresses); NORMAN J. 
ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN, & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 
2003-2004 (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at tbl.2-10) [hereinafter VITAL STATIS-
TICS], to be available at http://www.aei.org. 
83 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 82, at tbl.2-12. 
84 Hirsch, supra note 81, at 182. 
85 Id. 
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These facts are particularly striking because the 2002 elections 
were the first elections held after the latest reapportionment.86  His-
torically, incumbents suffer in such elections.  As their old voters dis-
appear and new voters replace old voters, incumbents usually find 
their seats less secure.  These new voters can have quite different in-
terests than previous constituents.  From 1972 to 1992, in fact, House 
turnover averaged forty-five percent higher in immediate post-
reapportionment Congresses.  These Congresses contained an aver-
age of eighty-seven freshmen, while the others in this period con-
tained only sixty.87  In 2002, however, only fifty-four freshmen were 
elected to the House—less than half the number elected in 1992.88  In 
2002, incumbents had a very easy ride overall.  Only thirty-five incum-
bents retired (rather than the average of forty-eight in other recent 
post-reapportionment Congress), only eight lost in the primaries, and 
only eight lost in the general election—in each case half the losses 
were to another incumbent.89  This lack of competition was, moreover, 
peculiar to the people’s chamber.  On the same day that less than ten 
percent of House races were being decided by margins of ten percent 
or less, nearly half of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races were that 
close.90  As one critic of the practice has pointed out, no one can ger-
rymander a statewide district.91 
To critics of partisan gerrymandering, current political conditions 
have both increased the incentives to gerrymander and exacerbated 
the democratic pathologies caused by gerrymandering.  Over the last 
fifteen years, American politics on the national level has been subject 
to a striking paradox:  it has become much more competitive at the 
macro level, when it comes to institutional control, but much less 
competitive at the micro level, when it comes to individual seats.  Re-
cent presidential elections have been very close and the Senate and 
House have been evenly or nearly evenly divided.  As the 2000 elec-
tions showed, the two major parties enjoy nearly equal popular sup-
port across the nation as a whole.  While one presidential candidate 
won a plurality of votes, the other won a victory in the Electoral Col-
 
86 See id. at 184 (discussing reapportionment following the 2000 census). 
87 Id. at 183. 
88 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 82, at tbl.2-7. 
89 Id.  
90 Hirsch, supra, note 81, at 183. 
91 See id. (discussing the peculiarity that roughly half the Senate elections were 
competitive, despite the lack of competition in the House elections during the same 
period). 
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lege; the Senate became split exactly in two; and the majority party’s 
control of the House stood on an extremely slim margin (221-212).92 
In terms of popular support, the two major parties are more 
evenly matched than at any time since the nineteenth century.93  And 
although the midterm elections of 2002 increased the size of the rul-
ing party’s margin in the House by six seats,94 that margin still stands 
near its modern low.  The 2002 elections culminated a decade-long 
trend.  The largest margin of majority in the House since 1992 was less 
than one-third the historical average from 1960 until 1992, and the 
average margin for the last ten years is barely one-sixth of the average 
for the preceding period.95  By any standard—historical or absolute—
the margin of control in the House has been astonishingly narrow 
over the past ten years. 
At first that might appear to be a good thing.  After all, one might 
think that small margins of control would force the parties to cooper-
ate, solve problems together, and allow some of their more centrist 
representatives a greater voice.  However, the opposite may be true.  
First, the major parties in the House have become increasingly 
homogeneous and ideologically polarized.96  Poole-Rosenthal DW-
NOMINATE scores, a widely accepted measure of congressional ide-
ology, show how markedly the parties have diverged over the last thirty 
years.97  These scores place each member of Congress on a liberal-
conservative scale from -1.0 (liberal) to 1.0 (conservative) on the basis 
of nonunanimous roll call votes.  From the early 1970s on, the average 
scores for House members of the Democratic and Republican parties 
have steadily and radically diverged.98  In fact, the score gap nearly 
 
92 Gary C. Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided:  The Clinton Legacy and the Congres-
sional Elections of 2000, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 5, 5 (2001). 
93 Id. at 5-6. 
94 Hirsch, supra note 81, at 182 (noting the direction and magnitude of the shift in 
House seats in the 2002 midterm election). 
95 See Brief of Political Scientists Bernard Grofman and Gary Jacobson as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4 fig.1, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) 
(No. 02-1580) (charting the size of House majorities between 1960 and 2002; the larg-
est margin after 1992 is 13, the average margin for the period 1960 to 1992 is 45). 
96 See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 242-50 (5th 
ed. 2001). 
97 See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING chs. 2-4, app. A (1997) (explaining and justifying DW-
NOMINATE scores as a method of measuring congressional ideology); see also David 
Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers:  A 
Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 980-81 (1999) (using DW-
NOMINATE scores to evaluate committee and party preferences). 
98 See Brief of Political Scientists at 11 fig.6, Vieth (No. 02-1580). 
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doubled over that time and now amounts to over 0.86 points on what 
is only a 2-point scale.99 
Second, the major parties in the House have become much more 
internally homogeneous.  There is now much less divergence than be-
fore within each party.  As a comparison of Figures 1 through 4 shows, 
not only have both parties in the House shifted more towards the ex-
tremes, leading to less overlap in their policy positions, but each party 
has a much more cohesive focus than before.100   
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99 See id. at 9 (showing an increase from slightly less than 0.5 for the 87th Congress 
in the 1961-1962 term, to well over 0.8 by the 106th Congress in the 1999-2000 term). 
100 JACOBSON, supra note 96, at 246-47 figs.8-4A to -4D.  
101 Figure 1 is taken from id. at 246 fig.8-4A.  
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102 Figure 2 is taken from id. at 246 fig.8-4B.  
103 Figure 3 is taken from id. at 247 fig.8-4C.  
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In other words, the two major parties in the House have become 
increasingly discrete and insular.  On policy issues, they are both more 
distant from each other and more internally homogeneous than be-
fore. 
In such a world, small differences matter.  The increasingly nar-
row margins of control over the past ten years mean that a gain of just 
a few seats can completely switch party control of the House.  From 
the 1970s through the early 1990s, for example, changes of up to 
twenty-five seats in any election would have made no difference to 
which party controlled the House.105  After 1992, however, a difference 
of as few as six seats and at most thirteen would have made all the dif-
ference.106  The increasing homogeneity of each party over that same 
time, moreover, means that the party in control now should have a 
 
104 Figure 4 is taken from id. at 247 fig.8-4D.  
105 For example, the 92nd Congress (1971-1973 term) had a seventy-five seat De-
mocrat-Republican differential—255 Democrats and 180 Republicans—in the House 
of Representatives.  See DUBIN, supra note 82, at 675.  The 103rd Congress (1993-1995 
term) had an eighty-two seat Democratic-Republican differential—258 Democrats, 176 
Republicans, and one independent—in the House of Representatives.  See id. at 785. 
106 For example, the 104th Congress (1995-1997 term) had just a twenty-six seat 
Republican-Democrat differential—230 Republicans, 204 Democrats, and one inde-
pendent—in the House of Representatives.  If just thirteen districts had voted for De-
mocrats instead of Republicans, the House would have been equally divided.  See id. at 
796. 
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greater focus and should have to worry less about its individual mem-
bers deviating from its preferred policy positions.  The increasing po-
larization sharply raises the stakes of House control for each side.  
Since larger policy differences separate the parties, such control pre-
sumably has a greater effect on legislative policy outcomes. 
In the 1970s, when less distance separated the two parties and they 
were less homogeneous, control of the House mattered less because 
the policy outcomes sought and produced under one party would 
have been relatively similar to those sought and produced under the 
other.  Once the parties’ policy preferences markedly diverged and 
party members in the House voted more in lockstep than before, the 
policy stakes greatly increased.  Because of their ideological polariza-
tion, each party wants more extreme policies than before and, be-
cause of homogenization, the party in control finds it much easier to 
achieve its preferred policies, even with a small margin.107  Thus, the 
stakes of redistricting have grown in two mutually reinforcing ways:  
narrow margins of control mean that differences in just a few seats can 
change which party controls the House, and a difference in party con-
trol makes a much larger difference in legislative policy outcomes.  
Shifting fewer seats produces larger legislative payoffs than before. 
To gain seats through redistricting requires a party in control of 
the redistricting process in individual states to follow a simple strategy:  
that party must make its opponent’s districts as few as possible and its 
own as many as possible.  To minimize the number of opposition dis-
tricts, the party in control must pack as many of its opponent’s voters 
as possible into each district the opponent controls.  This leads to the 
opposition party winning districts by a landslide, but winning fewer 
districts.  By contrast, to maximize the number of its own districts, the 
controlling party must assign as few of its own voters to as many dis-
tricts as it can while maintaining a reliable majority in each of them.  
This leads to the controlling party giving itself a comfortable but less 
sizeable margin in the maximum number of districts.  The strategy 
thus aims to make virtually every district noncompetitive and achieves 
its partisan ends by making the districts differentially noncompetitive 
for each party.  By creating super-safe districts for the opposing party 
and merely safe districts for itself, the controlling party “wastes” mi-
nority party votes and efficiently distributes its own.  Knowing that 
“one person, one vote” and race are virtually their only legal con-
 
107 In other words, because homogenization reduces ideological differences within 
a party, members of a given party are more likely to share ideologies and goals. 
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straints,108 party strategists feel free to draw such lines.  In a real sense, 
representatives can reflect the districts of the people, rather than the 
people of the districts. 
A party, of course, wants to reach no further than it can reliably 
grasp.  Otherwise, a small shift in public opinion can cause its gerry-
mandering to backfire, giving the district to the other party.109  To 
prevent this, the party in control of redistricting can be expected to 
give itself more than a thin margin of victory in its districts.  It may 
even sacrifice a seat or two to ensure that it will maintain control over 
a majority of districts should voter sentiment shift somewhat in the 
later years of the reapportionment cycle.  This insurance reduces 
competition in nearly every district.  The party that is victim to the 
gerrymander will enjoy wins in as few districts as possible but will win 
each by a landslide; the party in control of the gerrymander will enjoy 
wins in a disproportionately large number of districts but by smaller 
margins.  Few, if any, districts will remain in true competition. 
Empirical research shows how great this effect is.  As one leading 
political scientist describes it, redistricting after the last census gave: 
[M]arginal incumbents of both parties got safer districts.  Redistricting 
gave eight Democrat incumbents who had been representing Bush-
majority districts [districts in which Republican George W. Bush had 
won the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election] new Gore-
majority districts [districts in which Democrat Al Gore had won the 
popular vote in that election]; only one suffered the contrary switch . . . . 
All thirteen of the switches involving Republican incumbents were from 
Gore- to Bush-majority districts.  Of the twenty-five districts Republicans 
had won in 2000 with less than 55 percent of the major-party vote, eight-
een were strengthened by increasing the proportion of Bush voters; of 
the nineteen similarly marginal Democratic districts, fifteen were given a 
larger share of Gore voters.  Thus three quarters of the marginal districts 
were made safer by redistricting, half of them by more than 2 percentage 
points (in presidential vote share).  If analysis is confined to districts with 
 
108 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legisla-
tive districts must be divided equally by population); see also David M. Guin et al., Redis-
tricting in 2001 and Beyond:  Navigating the Narrow Channel Between the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 225, 228 (1999) (listing districting 
principles, including one person, one vote); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why 
Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1204-05 (1996) (explaining how one person, 
one vote limits apportionment possibilities); Eric J. Stockman, Constitutional Gerryman-
dering:  Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1227, 1257 (1993) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote limit on reapportionment). 
109 Cf. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151-59 (1984) (“If [the 
party] believes that future electoral or demographic tides will flow in its direction, then 
the party will be more willing to take chances by creating more competitive seats.”). 
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marginal incumbents who sought reelection in 2002, thirty-two of their 
forty districts (80 percent) were made safer by redistricting.110 
In individual states, the effects could be even more extreme.  Ger-
rymandering in California after the last census, for example, “left not 
a single one of the state’s fifty-three House districts truly competi-
tive.”111 
Long-term trends exacerbate this effect.  Since at least the mid-
twentieth century, competitiveness in House districts has markedly 
declined.  In the decade of elections after the 1960s reapportionment, 
for example, an average of 74 seats were won with less than 55% of the 
majority party vote.112  In the decade of elections after the 1990s reap-
portionment, by contrast, that figure fell by more than 10% to 65 
seats.113 
More ominously, in the years prior to the 2002 election (with the 
exception of the 1972 Nixon-McGovern election), elections immedi-
ately following reapportionment have always shown an increase in dis-
trict competitiveness.  As one commentator has summed up the data 
shown in Table 1: 
[E]lections held in the immediate aftermath of reapportionment . . . 
have generated particularly large freshman classes and have returned 
fewer incumbents than have other elections.  On average, more incum-
bents retire from the House in post-reapportionment election cycles, 
more are defeated in primaries, more lose in the November general 
elections, and fewer win landslide reelections. . . . [O]n average, since 
1972, membership turnover has been about 45% larger in post-
reapportionment Congresses, with 87 freshmen rather than 60.  If any-
thing, this tendency for greater turnover in post-redistricting election cy-
cles had appeared to be increasing, as the 1992 elections had generated 
a freshman class with 110 members. 
 The normal pattern did not hold up in 2002.  Quite the opposite:  
The 108th Congress (2003-2004) will have only 54 freshmen—fewer than 
in the typical non-reapportionment election cycle, far below the norm 
for a redistricting year, and less than half the 1992 figure. . . . 
 
110 Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain, and Turnout:  Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elec-
tions, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 10 (2003).  
111 Id. 
112 See Brief of Political Scientists at 6 fig.2, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 
(2004) (No. 02-1580) (showing that 74 seats in 1962, 106 in 1964, 74 in 1966, 63 in 
1968, and 52 in 1970 were won with less than fifty-five percent of the majority vote). 
113 Id. (showing that 81 seats in 1992, 85 in 1994, 77 in 1996, 42 in 1998, and 42 in 
2000 were won with less than fifty-five percent of the majority vote). 
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This lack of competition was peculiar to U.S. House elections:  On
the same day when barely one out of twelve House elections were being
decided by ten percentage points or less, roughly half of all gubernato-
rial and U.S. Senate elections were that close.
114
Table 1:  Comparison of the 2002 Election with














     By >20 Points 297 261 338
     By <20 Points 78 87 43
Incumbents Defeated 21 35 16
     In the Primary 3 13 8




New Members 60 87 54
Deadened competition has both individual and aggregate effects.
On the individual level, it means that representatives have less fear of
the regular judgment of the voters.  The less competitive districts are,
the less incumbents will fear defeat at the polls, thus making them less
responsive to general election voters.  A representative who squeaks by
will be very sensitive to what constituents want; a representative as-
sured of a landslide will be less so.  Uncompetitive districts, then,
weaken the structures of accountability that the Framers believed
made members of the House truly responsive to—and thus truly rep-
resentative of—the people.
On the aggregate level, deadened competition means that the
House of Representatives as a whole will not reflect changes in senti-
ment among voters as well.  Because so few districts can realistically
change parties, the House as a whole will fail to track shifts in underly-
114
Hirsch, supra note 81, at 183.
115
The data shown in Table 1 are taken from id. at 183 tbl.1.
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ing popular opinion.  A national swing of five percent in voter opin-
ion—a sea change in most elections—will change very few seats in the 
current House of Representatives.  Gerrymandering thus creates a 
kind of inertia that arrests the House’s dynamic process.  It makes it 
less certain that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular 
opinion, and thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic slip-
page between the people and their government. 
Although partisan gerrymandering deadens competition within 
individual districts, that is its method, not its aim.  Its aim, of course, is 
to give one of the major parties an advantage over the other in Con-
gress.116  Comparing the major parties’ shares of the 2000 presidential 
vote in the pre- and post-reapportionment House districts demon-
strates how thoroughly current political gerrymandering has achieved 
this.  As Gary Jacobson has explained, “[t]he Bush-Gore vote division 
provides an excellent approximation of district partisanship.  Short-
term forces were evenly balanced in 2000, and party line voting was 
the highest in decades; hence, both the national and district-level vote 
reflected the underlying partisan balance with unusual accuracy.”117  
In other words, districts won by Democratic candidate Al Gore are 
generally Democratic while districts won by Republican candidate 
George W. Bush are generally Republican.  As Figure 5 shows, the 
post-census redistrictings helped make many districts comfortably but 
leanly Republican and many other districts landslide Democratic.  The 
last cycle of redistricting, in other words, made the parties’ seats dif-












116 See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats:  The Ultimate 
Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1985) (noting that 
gerrymandering “is an inherently political process” and is “‘unashamedly partisan’” 
(quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev’d, 478 U.S. 
109 (1986))).  
117 Jacobson, supra note 110, at 9. 
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Figure 5:  Distribution of Bush Districts and  
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In fact, all the districts in the country with party landslides of over 
eighty percent were won by Democrats.  In some states, of course, 
Democratic-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Democ-
rats’ share of the state congressional delegation; in others, Republi-
can-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Republicans’ 
share.  Both sides are guilty of taking advantage of such possibilities 
because the stakes are so high.  In the 1980s, California Democrats 
were among the most notorious offenders;119 in 2003, the Texas Re-
publicans were the notable offenders.120  On balance, however, as Fig-
ure 5 shows, the post-2000 census plans advantaged the Republicans.  
 
118 Figure 5 is taken from Hirsch, supra note 81, at 197 fig.2.  Figure 5 shows the 
number of districts won by Bush and by Gore, broken down by the percentage of the 
vote that the winner received in that district.  For instance, Bush won by receiving 50-
55% of the votes in 68 districts, while Gore won with 50-55% of the votes in only 43 dis-
tricts; Bush did not win a single district by more than 90% of the vote, whereas Gore 
won four districts with more than 90% of the vote. 
119 See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (discussing a Califor-
nia redistricting plan that changed the composition of the California legislature from 
twenty-two Democrats and twenty-one Republicans to twenty-eight Democrats and sev-
enteen Republicans), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). 
120 See Note, The Implications of Coalitional and Influence Districts for Vote Dilution Liti-
gation, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2598, 2614 (2004) (“Texas Republicans, having taken control 
of the legislature in 2003, attempted to redraw the state’s district lines between decen-
nial censuses to increase the Republican Party’s representation in Congress.”). 
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The net effect was to increase the number of Republican districts by 
nine, from 228 to 237121—perhaps giving Republicans control of the 
House for the remainder of the decade. 
By making individual districts noncompetitive, partisan gerry-
mandering also frustrates the representation of centrist views in the 
House.  Safe districts are drawn to be either more conservative or 
more liberal than a non-gerrymandered district would be; their aver-
age voter is intended to be reliably off the overall median.  Artificially 
skewing districts in this way ensures the election of candidates from 
particular parties, but also makes it less likely that candidates who re-
flect the views of these median voters will be elected.  In advantaging 
one political party, then, partisan gerrymandering not only disadvan-
tages the other major political party and makes districts uncompeti-
tive, but it also makes the representation of centrist views more diffi-
cult. 
Another feature of elections exacerbates this effect.  Deadening 
competition between the major parties shifts any real political compe-
tition in the district into one party’s primary, where ideological activ-
ists dominate.122  Centrist candidates of both parties have trouble sur-
viving in safe districts because in the primaries they must appeal to a 
group of voters representative neither of the district as a whole, nor of 
the party as a whole—rather, the group of voters at primaries repre-
sents only the party’s more partisan members.123  More sharply ideo-
logical candidates appeal to this primary electorate.  Democratic pri-
mary voters vote for more left-leaning candidates than the average 
Democrat, let alone the average voter, would, and Republican primary 
voters vote for more right-leaning candidates than the average Repub-
lican or average voter would.  As a result, districts elect candidates 
more extreme than the general population of voters in the district, 
and the House has become bipolar124 even though the country has  
 
 
121 Jacobson, supra note 110, at 9 (citing Jacobson, supra note 92, at 5-13).  
122 David Brady & Morris Fiorina, Congress in the Era of the Permanent Campaign, in 
THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 134, 135-36 (Norman Ornstein & Thomas 
Mann eds., 2000) (stating that because primary electorates are small and unrepresen-
tative, “members of Congress may be forced to play to noncentrist elements of their 
constituencies”). 
123 Id. 
124 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing DW-NOMINATE 
scores and their suggestion that the ideological gap between political parties has grown 
in the last several decades). 
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stayed largely in the middle.125  Making districts safe thus silences the 
center. 
Unlike the Framers’ vision, a gerrymandered House does not re-
flect popular sentiment in all its diversity, but the sentiment of one ex-
treme or the other in districts across the country.  And that is not the 
worst.  Just as polarization within the House is one of the primary ef-
fects of partisan gerrymandering, it is also one of the primary causes.  
Polarization of a nearly evenly split House greatly raises the stakes of 
redistricting and so increases the incentives to gerrymander, which in 
turn leads to further polarization in the House.  Far from limiting it-
self, under these conditions, partisan gerrymandering is self-
intensifying.  Polarization and partisan gerrymandering thus form a 
vicious circle where increases in one increase the likelihood of the 
other. 
The issues surrounding partisan gerrymandering are thus quite 
complex.  It raises not only the obvious concern of partisan political 
bias, but also less obvious concerns like the artificial lock-in of a tem-
porary majority in what was intended to be the most responsive part of 
the federal government; reduced competition within districts; re-
duced accountability and responsiveness of House members; and in-
creased polarization in the legislature.  Existing doctrine does not 
consider, let alone address, most of these concerns. 
B.  Saving Politics from Theory:  Political Gerrymandering in the Court 
In Davis v. Bandemer,126 the Supreme Court first took up the ger-
rymandering issue and splintered over whether and how to address it.  
Although a majority of six Justices believed that partisan gerrymander-
ing claims were justiciable,127 no majority agreed as to how to handle 
them.128  The decisive plurality of four generally followed the ap-
 
125 Democrats Still Hold a Small Lead in Party Identification, According to National Harris 
Interactive Survey; Almost No Change in Proportion That Consider Themselves Conservatives, 
Liberals and Moderates, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 27, 2004, available at LEXIS, Campaign 2004 
News.  (“Self-described moderates (40%) continue to outnumber those who consider 
themselves conservatives (33%) or liberals (18%). These numbers have been remarka-
bly stable over more than 30 years.”).   
126 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
127 Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, id. at 123-25, Powell, and Ste-
vens, id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, 
J.,) believed the partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable. 
128 Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun joined.  Id. at 123 (White, J., plurality opinion).  Chief Justice Burger 
concurred in the judgment, id. at 143 (Burger, C.J., concurring), as did as did Justice 
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proach taken in the racial gerrymandering cases, but changed the 
governing equal protection standards to account for perceived differ-
ences between race and politics.129  The doctrinal shift was dramatic.  
Ordinary equal protection doctrine requires a showing of both dis-
criminatory intent and discriminatory effects.130  Of these two re-
quirements, intent is usually the more difficult to prove.131  In Bande-
mer, however, the plurality turned that on its head.  “As long as 
redistricting is done by a legislature,” the plurality wrote, “it should 
not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of 
the reapportionment were intended.”132  Discriminatory effects, by 
contrast, would be very difficult to prove.  As the plurality described 
the standard, “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the 
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade 
a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a 
whole.”133 
Two parts of this standard posed special difficulties to plaintiffs.  
First, showing that a system consistently degrades a voter’s or group of 
voters’ influence requires several election cycles of experience, or very 
firm predictive data, which is difficult to obtain.  Plaintiffs, then, 
would likely not be able to assert any claim until far into the ten-year 
districting cycle.  Second, plaintiffs had to show not just that the 
 
O’Connor, whose concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist, id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Powell concurred in part and 
dissented in part, joined by Justice Stevens.  Id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
129 See id. at 141-43 (“We . . . conclude . . . that a threshold showing of discrimina-
tory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation.”). 
130 See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980) (“Although dicta may be 
drawn from a few of the Court’s earlier opinions suggesting that disproportionate ef-
fects alone may establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution, the fact is that 
such a view is not supported by any decision of this Court.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or 
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). 
131 See e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (“As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable, 
evidence of intent has become harder to find.”); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in 
Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1137 (1989) (“Not only is it much more difficult 
to prove intent in the housing and employment cases, but, more interestingly, they in-
volve a completely different kind of inquiry.”). 
132 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (White, J., plurality opinion).  In an accompanying 
footnote, the plurality softened this view somewhat.  It noted that because “discrimina-
tory intent may not be difficult to prove in this context does not, of course, mean that 
it need not be proved at all to succeed on such a claim.”  Id. at 129 n.11. 
133 Id. at 132. 
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scheme degraded their voting power but also that it degraded their 
influence on the “political process as a whole.”134 
In Badham v. Eu,135 for example, a district court found that this 
second requirement saved an egregious Democratic gerrymander of 
California’s congressional districts after the 1980 census.  Since there 
were no allegations that California Republicans were “shut out of the 
political process” or that anyone had ever “interfered with Republican 
registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning” or Re-
publicans’ ability “to speak out on issues of public concern,”136 the dis-
trict court granted the state’s motion to dismiss.137  The court, in fact, 
dismissed the case with prejudice because other facts of which it took 
judicial notice showed that Republicans had some influence in other 
parts of the political process.  Chief among these facts was that Cali-
fornia had a Republican governor, one Republican senator, and a 
former Republican governor who, for seven years, had been President 
of the United States.138  But of course none of those officials had been 
elected from individual districts. 
The plurality believed that such a high standard was appropriate 
because “the power to influence the political process is not limited to 
winning elections.”139  As the plurality in Bandemer stated: 
An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate 
is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candi-
date and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as 
other voters in the district.  We cannot presume in such a situation, 
without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will en-
tirely ignore the interests of those voters.  This is true even in a safe dis-
trict where the losing group loses election after election.  Thus, a 
group’s electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the sim-
ple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more 
difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not 






134 Id. (emphasis added). 
135 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). 
136 Id. at 670. 
137 See id. at 672 (noting that because California Republicans represent a potent 
political force, it is unnecessary for the judiciary to intervene as it would in order to 
“protect the trampled rights of a disadvantaged political or racial minority”). 
138 Id. 
139 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (White, J., plurality opinion). 
140 Id. 
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While it is true that voters can achieve some representation even 
through representatives they voted against, it is also true that “winning 
elections” is the most powerful way to influence the political process 
and that artificially making winning elections more difficult for one 
group than for others impairs that group’s political power.  Not only 
did the plurality’s reasoning surprisingly underplay the importance of 
elections, it also failed to consider the wider range of concerns raised 
by partisan gerrymandering.  Although it acknowledged the partisan 
skew that gerrymandering may give to politics,141 it did not consider 
issues of lock-in, competitiveness, responsiveness, accountability, and 
polarization—all of which deeply affect the substance and structure of 
politics.  The equal protection lens developed by the plurality placed 
all these concerns far out of focus. 
To her credit, Justice O’Connor did look more broadly.142  Even 
she, however, saw only one larger political concern implicated in the 
dispute:  whether constitutional regulation of partisan gerrymander-
ing would undermine the two-party system, which she viewed as the 
bedrock of our political system.  As Justice O’Connor put it: 
 There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable 
two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound 
and effective government.  The preservation and health of our political 
institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the contin-




Her fear was that once the Court entered this area it would have 
no choice but to apply a proportionality test to all identifiable “po-
litical, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic 
groups.”144  And even if the Court limited the inquiry to just political 
groups, she believed “[t]here is simply no clear stopping point to pre-
vent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional 
representation for every cohesive political group.”145  If realized, her 
fear would have moved the country towards a coalitional multiparty 
 
141 See id. at 116-17 (acknowledging that a Republican advantage was “achieved by 
‘stacking’ Democrats into districts with large Democratic majorities and ‘splitting’ 
them in other districts so as to give Republicans safe but not excessive majorities in 
those districts”). 
142 See id. at 144-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern 
that if political gerrymandering becomes justiciable, such judicial intervention will 
pose a risk to our political institution). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 147. 
145 Id. 
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government.  That, by itself, was enough for her to deny the courts 
power to hear these claims.146 
Her approach represents another version of the “got theory” ar-
gument.  Unlike what Justices Frankfurter and Harlan might argue,147 
Justice O’Connor does not argue that a viable competing theory of 
representation underlies partisan gerrymandering.  Two-party gov-
ernment, she recognized, is not the aim of partisan gerrymandering.  
Rather, artificially “skewed” two-party government is its effect.  But 
that is still a form of two-party politics.  By contrast, imposing a theory 
of partisan fairness on the redistricting process would, she believes, 
have the effect of undermining what she sees as a foundational value 
of our political system.148  Whether she is right or not, her argument 
does extend the frame of analysis to encompass a relevant political 
value invisible to ordinary equal protection doctrine, and implicitly 
weighs that value against others that judicial intervention would pro-
mote.  She invokes a type of “got theory” argument to decide what 
would make the best pragmatic sense, not to reflexively foreclose judi-
cial inquiry. 
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,149 the Supreme Court’s recent political gerry-
mandering decision, the Court surprisingly avoided “got theory” ar-
guments altogether.  This case challenged a 2002 Pennsylvania con-
gressional districting scheme that aided Republican congressional 
candidates, and which was passed by a Republican-controlled state leg-
islature and signed by a Republican governor.150  The Court reached 
no majority opinion.  Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of 
four Justices,151 found all political gerrymandering claims nonjusticia-
ble for lack of any judicially manageable standards to us in deciding 
them.152  Justice Kennedy, by contrast, found political gerrymandering 
 
146 See id. at 145, 147 (“[N]o group right to an equal share of political power was 
ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
147 Cf. supra text accompanying note 60 (concluding that under Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan’s “got theory” argument the mere possibility of a civic rationale 
would validate seemingly racial motives). 
148 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he 
proportional representation towards which the Court’s expansion of equal protection 
doctrine will lead is [not] consistent with our history, our traditions, or our political 
institutions.”). 
149 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). 
150 Id. at 1773 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
151 Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion.  Id.  Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.  Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
152 See id. at 1778 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially discernible and 
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claims to be justiciable, but rejected the claim in Vieth itself.153  Al-
though the plaintiffs, in his view, had not carried their burden of 
showing that judicially manageable standards existed, he believed that 
others in the future might be able to carry this burden.154  And Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer believed manageable standards 
existed to adjudicate such claims, although they differed somewhat as 
to what those standards were.155  In short, five Justices believed politi-
cal gerrymandering claims were or could be justiciable, while five Jus-
tices rejected the political gerrymandering claim in Vieth because no 
judicially manageable standards were available to decide it. 
This confusing fragmentation on the Court obscures a surprising 
and deep agreement.  Despite their great differences as to whether 
the courts can decide such claims, eight Justices agree that the Consti-
tution forbids at least extreme forms of partisan gerrymandering and 
the remaining Justice, Justice Kennedy, believes that it might do so.  
The four dissenting Justices, of course, necessarily believe this.  Oth-
erwise, they could not authorize judicial intervention.  And Justice 
Kennedy must hold out this possibility if he truly believes that future 
plaintiffs might persuade the Court that judicially manageable stan-
dards to address such claims exist.156  The positions of these five are 
unsurprising.  What is surprising is that the four Justices who held that 
no judicially manageable standards exist could believe that the Consti-
tution itself proscribes extreme gerrymandering.  As they make clear, 
the justiciability problem is epistemological, not ontological.  In other 
words, they believe a constitutional rule against such gerrymandering 
 
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.  
Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticia-
ble . . . .”). 
153 See id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would not fore-
close all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to 
correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”). 
154 See id. at 1798-99 (“If workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens, 
however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”). 
155 See id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that asks 
“whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the 
lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.”); id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined 
by Ginsburg, J.) (calling for a standard that requires “a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a 
prima facie cause of action” and then allowing the state to rebut the evidence and “of-
fer an affirmative justification for the districting choices”); id. at 1827-29 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (providing indicia to identify the “unjustified entrenching in power of a 
political party that the voters have rejected”). 
156 See id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“That no . . . stan-
dard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in 
the future.”). 
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exists but that the courts cannot describe it.  It is like firmly believing 
there is a God, but that knowing anything about this God lies beyond 
human understanding. 
Justice Scalia makes this clear for the plurality in his criticism of 
Justice Stevens’s recognition of individual district-specific gerryman-
dering claims.  Justice Scalia carefully separates out the argument that 
political gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties, an argu-
ment with which he disagrees, from the argument that the courts can 
do anything about these difficulties.  He writes: 
Much of [Justice Stevens’s] dissent is addressed to the incompatibility of 
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles.  We do not 
disagree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the judg-
ment that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in im-
peachment proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obli-
gation to “try” impeachments.  The issue we have discussed is not 
whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but 
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to 
design a remedy. . . . 
 . . . Justice Stevens says we err in assuming that politics is an ordinary 
and lawful motive in districting—but all he brings forward to contest that 
is the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful.  So it is, 
and so does our opinion assume.157 
Justiciability difficulties spring not from any doubt that the Consti-
tution forbids some gerrymandering.  There is none.  They spring 
rather from the courts’ inability to identify and correct unconstitu-
tional gerrymandering.  Excessive politics is unconstitutional; the 
courts, however, cannot tell when the line is crossed. 
Given this particular view of why the courts cannot entertain po-
litical gerrymandering claims, it is not surprising that “got theory” ar-
guments play no real role in the decision.  Those in the strategic posi-
tion to invoke the arguments, the plurality, share with the dissenters 
the belief that the Constitution does have a particular democratic the-
ory which trumps conflicting legislative theories.  They just do not 
know what it is and, unlike Justice Kennedy, they think that such 
knowledge is forever unattainable.  This position, although it points to 
the same remedial consequence that a “got theory” argument would—
namely, none—has quite different legitimating implications.  Unlike 
 
157 Id. at 1785 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (internal citations, some internal quo-
tation marks, and alteration omitted). 
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s “got theory” argument,158 the plural-
ity’s position provides no fig leaf for improper legislative motivations.  
It does not pretend to defer to a conflicting but permissible theory of 
democracy.  It just steps out of the way without making any statement 
about what the legislature did and so creates no dangerous false con-
sciousness about legislative motivations.  In fact, insofar as it insists 
that the Constitution does care about improper partisanship in redis-
tricting but remains silent as to how it cares, the plurality’s position 
may encourage citizens to engage and evaluate gerrymanders more 
critically.  They will, after all, have little by which to judge them other 
than their own best “theories” of democratic fair play. 
C.  The Academic Debate 
The academic commentary on partisan gerrymandering looks a 
little different.  It reaches more widely than the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court and at times illustrates the more traditional use of the 
“got theory” argument as a conversation-stopper.  The best example of 
the debate is the recent spirited interchange between Samuel Issa-
charoff and Nathaniel Persily in the Harvard Law Review.  In his piece, 
Issacharoff criticizes partisan gerrymandering primarily because it 
leads to uncompetitive districts, and he ultimately proposes a strong 
form of prophylaxis:  “[T]he Court should forbid ex ante the participa-
tion of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process, instead of 
trying to police redistricting outcomes ex post.”159  In other words, he 
would find unconstitutional any plan resulting from a process con-
trolled by insiders.  In his response, Persily takes on many of Issa-
charoff’s claims.  He argues, among other things, that incumbent 
turnover rates are healthy,160 that congressional districts are largely 
competitive,161 and that because incumbency rates are similar in state-
wide and districted races that gerrymandering cannot be responsible 
 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 13-29, 39-48 (discussing Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan’s “got theory” arguments in Colegrove v. Green and Baker v. Carr, respec-
tively). 
159 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
643 (2002) (emphasis added). 
160 See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 654 (2002) 
(“[T]here has been steady and significant turnover both in Congress and in state legis-
latures—a quite healthy level of ‘ritual cleansing’ despite bipartisan gerrymanders.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 615)). 
161 See id. at 661-64 (“[A] large share, perhaps a majority, of the districts might be 
considered competitive.”). 
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for any lack of competitiveness.162  Both he and Issacharoff impres-
sively mount a wide variety of empirical evidence in support of their 
respective positions.163 
At bottom, however, their disagreement is largely normative.  Issa-
charoff believes that most districting plans reflect officeholders’ po-
litical self-interest, which impairs political competitiveness, respon-
siveness, and accountability.  Persily, on the other hand, believes that 
these are only some of many possible legitimate values and that legis-
latures should remain free to pursue others.  As he puts it: 
[F]or several reasons politicians should be in charge of politics. . . . 
[C]oncerns about representation and governance are of equal weight to 
concerns about electoral competition, and there is no philosophically 
uncontestable reason why judges should force one set of values rather 
than another down the throat of state governments.
164
 
To Persily, a constitutional rule, let alone one that takes redistrict-
ing out of the hands of legislatures, will foreclose “alternative redis-
tricting strategies [that] maximize . . . welfare in different ways.”165  In 
particular: 
One approach might maximize intradistrict competition, another might 
try to maximize competition for control of the legislature, another might 
seek to maximize the number of voters who are happy with their repre-
sentative, and still others might seek to increase the probability that gov-
ernment will work better.  There are tradeoffs for each approach.  Good 
arguments can defend each approach, but it would be truly remarkable 
for unelected judges with lifetime appointments to decide that competi-
tion is the value that should be placed above all others.
166
 
Persily sums up his disagreement with Issacharoff  in the final 
lines of his piece.  Issacharoff’s approach, he believes, suffers from: 
[A] preoccupation with one democratic value without situating it in the 
political system as a whole.  Perhaps district-level competition is “an in-
dependent democratic good”; rules governing redistricting need only be 
“normatively proper” rather than empirically justifiable; and certain 
 
162 See id. at 664-67 (arguing that the causal relationship between gerrymandering 
and any lack of competitiveness is undermined by the “high reelection rates of incum-
bents in statewide races, such as those for the U.S. Senate, which are unaffected by re-
districting”). 
163 See, e.g., id. at 666 tbl.1 (comparing data on rates of incumbent reelection in 
the Senate and House of Representatives to undermine the causal relationship be-
tween gerrymandering and any lack of competitiveness). 
164 Id. at 678. 
165 Id. at 680. 
166 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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groups, such as moderate voters, should be given greater voice.  By 
breathing those principles into the Constitution and striking down every 
existing districting system, however, judges would be mandating a par-
ticularistic and highly contestable vision of the proper working of 
American democracy.  Those hoping to take the politics out of the redis-
tricting process must be very confident that they have discovered a way to 
strike the balance between the competing political values central to de-
mocratic government.  Lacking that confidence, I would leave the ulti-
mate decision to the admittedly self-interested but more accountable po-
litical bodies that have found various ways of striking the balance.
167
 
Sound familiar?  Persily is channeling Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan.  Like them, he points to other theories of politics as a reason 
to foreclose constitutional regulation.  Where he differs from his 
predecessors is that he offers arguments in support of some of these 
alternatives.  Although many will not agree with his reasoning,168 he 
does defend his theories.  Unlike his predecessors, he does not simply 
assert or assume their validity. 
Another similarity between Persily and his predecessors, however, 
undermines his effort to employ these alternative theories to norma-
tively justify districting plans.  Like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, 
Persily does not require that any of these theories actually underlie a 
districting plan.  That one could support a plan will suffice.169  His re-
luctance to require a showing that a disputed plan actually embodies a 
theory is understandable.  Doing so would follow Justice Stewart down 
his blind alley.170  How would a court tell the difference between a 
plan embodying a possibly confusing mixture of theories and one 
embodying no theory at all?  How civically embarrassing would it be to 
uncover the actual justification for a plan, which may often be nothing 
 
167 Id. at 680-81 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 622, 
626). 
168 This is particularly true of his argument that maximizing intradistrict homoge-
neity is normatively attractive.  See id. at 668; see, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Iden-
tity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Associating, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 
1254 (2003) (“[B]y reducing political competition through limiting the pool of indi-
viduals the plaintiffs could reach out to for political support . . . [t]he state stunted the 
process of democracy.” (footnote omitted)); Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 617 (noting 
the “legitimizing role of competition before the electorate”); Spencer Overton, Re-
straint and Responsibility:  Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 
718 (2004) (“[A] court should aspire to ensure that reforms do not, on the whole, di-
minish competition.”). 
169 See Persily, supra note 160, at 680-81 (noting the many values that might under-
lie a districiting plan and observing that “good arguments can defend each ap-
proach”).   
170 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (arguing that Justice Stewart’s ap-
proach is unmanageable because it requires difficult judicial inquiry). 
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more than incumbent self-interest?  In short, Persily is absolutely 
right, as were Justices Frankfurter and Harlan before him.  Imposing 
one particular theory on politics comes at a loss, for it displaces other 
possibly valid theories.  But his own approach, like Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan’s, fails to require—or even make likely—that a districting 
plan will embody any theory at all. 
This is not to say that Issacharoff is right.  His approach will strike 
many as exceeding clear constitutional authority.  Indeed, any broad 
ex ante prophylactic approach will be controversial in this way.  It is 
easy, though, to see his motivation.  Putting districting into the hands 
of people who have no direct partisan or incumbency interest in its 
outcome would presumably reduce the influence of these types of self-
interest, while leaving room for the plan to reflect the types of values 
Persily mentions171—and others.  Although Issacharoff is concerned 
with competitiveness and incumbent entrenchment, he does not actu-
ally impose competitiveness on the redistricting process to the exclu-
sion of other values.  Rather, Issacharoff tries to remove direct incum-
bency and partisan concerns from the process as much as possible so 
that other more legitimate values may flourish.  Unless I am misread-
ing him, an independent redistricting commission should be free to 
follow the kinds of policies Persily advocates if it thought them wise. 
That leaves two other options.  One is to follow the course the 
Court itself took in the original reapportionment cases.  There the 
Court imposed a particular theory of representation on the redistrict-
ing process to the exclusion of other theories.172  It did not do so, 
however, because the theory was incontestably better than all others.  
It was not.  It did so rather because the theory was easy to administer 
and had some democratic virtues173 and, most importantly, because 
imposing some theory was the only way to ensure that any theory other 
than legislative self interest underlay districting schemes.174 
 
 
171 See Persily, supra note 160, at 680 (arguing that redistricting should be dele-
gated to those who are able to “strike the balance between the competing political val-
ues central to democratic government”).   
172 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legisla-
tive districts must be divided equally by population). 
173 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 121 (1998) (“In fact, administrability is [the] long suit [of the one person, one 
vote principle] . . . .”).  
174 See text accompanying notes 70-71 (arguing that the one person, one vote stan-
dard was chosen because it was an administrable theory of apportionment that would 
ensure some theoretical basis).   
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In the gerrymandering context, there is no simple, obvious candi-
date for such a theory, but there are several messy contenders.  One 
approach would be to return to so-called traditional redistricting 
principles like geographical compactness, contiguity, and preserving 
political subdivisions and communities of interest.175  While clear, 
agreed-upon yardsticks to measure these factors are unavailable, and 
trade-offs among them can be made in many legitimate ways, forcing 
some concern for these issues would reduce the freedom legislators 
now have to pursue unwholesome ends. 
A quite different approach, which was argued by some in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, looks to legislative motive.176  Like Issacharoff’s approach, it 
seeks to prevent bad motives from infecting districting plans, but does 
so through ex post review rather than ex ante prophylactic structur-
ing.  This approach would follow the controversial lead of the Court’s 
Shaw v. Reno line of cases.177  Many have criticized that line of cases,178 
but their aim is to screen plans after enactment for impermissible lev-
els of racial motivation.  The Court could take a similar (and perhaps 
similarly uncomfortable) approach with respect to certain partisan 
and incumbency motivations.  In fact, the dissenters in Vieth argued 
different combinations of these two approaches.179  It was their messi-
ness, however, that persuaded the plurality that no judicially manage-
able standards existed. 
 
175 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Dis-
tricts,” and Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). 
176 See 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that 
asks “whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control 
the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles”). 
177 The Supreme Court has held that while race may be a factor in districting, a 
plan which is primarily motivated by racial considerations to the point of subordinat-
ing traditional districting principles is unconstitutional.  For examples from this line of 
cases, see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 
(1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
178 See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:  Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw 
Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996) (exploring the tensions introduced into districting by 
the Shaw line of cases); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. 
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 906 n.3 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the plethora of articles 
written in response to the Shaw line of cases). 
179 See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the shared 
view of all dissenters it would be “profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial review of 
similar claims” in the future).   
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CONCLUSION 
The “got theory” argument, as employed by Justice Frankfurter, 
Justice Harlan, and Professor Persily, of course, easily avoids the diffi-
culties of these alternative approaches.  In avoiding difficulty, how-
ever, it does both too little and too much.  It does too little in allowing 
plans reflecting only legislative self-interest to escape scrutiny.  It does 
too much in suggesting that the reason plans should do so is that they 
actually reflect some lofty theory of politics.  The “got theory” argu-
ment can be both a boon and a trap.  When used by Justice O’Connor 
in Bandemer or by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove, it can help deepen 
discussion.  Although both Justices’ views in those cases are controver-
sial,180 they invoked this type of argument to analyze political concerns 
to which ordinary First Amendment doctrine is blind.  When used by 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Baker or by some academicians in 
the current debate, however, the argument has exactly the opposite 
effect.  By holding out the likely false hope that a districting plan em-
bodies a public-regarding purpose, it forecloses analysis of what the 
plan actually does.  It stops rather than furthers conversation. 
 
 
180 See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing, contrary to 
Justice O’Connor’s Bandemer concurrence, that there exist “applicable judicially man-
ageable standards”).  In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter held that Congress had exclusive 
authority over the Illinois districting.  However, the majority in Baker v. Carr found that 
a similar matter presented a justiciable cause of action.  369 U.S. 186 (1962).   
